

Analysis of Three Forms of Power by Joseph Nye.

Esheya Greg

Abstract— The politics of international relations since the end of the Second World War have been preoccupied with the business of mitigating chances of war among nations. The Liberal tradition proposed three solutions to this effect, including democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Neoliberalism, championed by Joseph Nye and Keohane advancing the liberal course, upholds the existence of anarchy within the international system but insists that that does not prevent cooperation. This led them to develop the notion of complex interdependence. It is within the ambience of this principle of complex interdependence that Joseph Nye developed his idea of three types of power. This work therefore is set to examine these three forms of power. According to him, there is hard, soft, and smart power. The data for this research is collected through library research. By analysing Nye's three forms of power, it was discovered that Nye introduced the third type or concept, smart power, as a means of smuggling hard power through the backdoor to override soft power. Acknowledging the defects of soft power, the paper is of the opinion that there will be greater peace in the international arena if nations can deploy the resources of soft power in their engagements. However, nations with greater military and economic resources are more prone to deploying their military might in settling international disputes than their soft power resources. Whether knowingly or unknowingly, Nye has given those with greater military powers a soft landing to deploy their hard power by the tool of smart power, which he argues can be deployed under contextual intelligence.

Keywords: Hard power; soft power; smart power; complex interdependence; contextual intelligence.

1, Department of Educational Foundations, Ebonyi State College Of Education, Ikwo Nigeria.

© 2024 the Authors. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0).

INTRODUCTION

War, according to Liberalism is the main problem in international politics. How nations, can therefore engage each other without war or at least chances of it curtailed then becomes the major goal of international relations. Liberalism proposes three solutions to this. The first is democracy: Liberals argue that democratic states are more peaceful with all other states and the main reason for this is that states' leaders are accountable and they fear that they may not be re-elected if they go to war: 'When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible' (Doyle, 1986, p.1151). The second solution is economic interdependence. Liberals affirm that international trade binds states together, as the interests of a state become those of other states. Thus, war appears too costly for states and they prefer to cooperate. International institutions are the third solution proposed by Liberalism. The theory implies that institutions enhance cooperation between states and therefore make war less likely. Neoliberal Institutionalism particularly looks at this solution: it argues that international institutions promote cooperation and limit the effects of anarchy

Indeed, Neoliberals accept the existence of anarchy within the international system, but that does not prevent cooperation. Keohane (1984) presents three advantages of international institutions under anarchy: they lower coordination costs, they raise the cost of cheating, and they diffuse information. Furthermore, Neoliberals believe that states are more concerned with absolute gains rather than relative gains. States conceive of their gains not in comparison with other states but looking towards the total gains, which enhances cooperation between them. Therefore, international relations may be a positive-sum interaction, where each side benefits from cooperation. Eventually, Keohane and Nye (1998, p.83) developed the notion of "complex interdependence", 'a world in which security and force matter less and countries are connected by multiple social and political relationships'. They found three conditions of complex interdependence: an increasing number of channels of contact between societies, the fact that governments reluctantly use military force, and that security is no longer the main issue in international relations but profit.

Joseph Samuel Nye is an American political Scientist born in 1937. He is University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the American Academy of Diplomacy (Harvard Kennedy School, 2021). Together with Robert Keohane, he co-founded the International Relations Theory of Neoliberalism. Joseph Nye has not just excelled in academics but has equally excelled in public service. From 1977 to 1979, Nye served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the era of the Cold War and the bipolar system. International policy was divided between the block of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union. In 1994 and 1995, Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs,

where he used his political science expertise to construct a new institutionalized relationship between the United States and Japan, which helped to defuse the trade conflict of that era (Nye, 2009). His academic knowledge and experience in public service combined to nurse his interest in the concept of power in international relations.

THE CONCEPT OF POWER

The concept “power” has been of interest to social scientists for centuries yet its meaning is elusive, not admitting to common definition, leading to notable academic debates over power’s specific definition and its features. Today the subject of power has become complex and ambiguous. One of the most influential definitions of power in the field of social science belongs to Max Weber (1947: 152) who defined it as the probability of one actor within a social relationship to be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance. According to Weber, power is a zero-sum game and is an attribute that derives from the qualities, resources and capabilities of one subject. However, the Weberian definition attracted a number of criticisms. Martin (1971: 243) pointed out that Weber did not define power, but rather provided the basis for a comparison between the attributes of actors. Moreover, the author argued that, by building the element of conflict into his definition and viewing power solely in zero-sum terms, Weber disregarded the possibility of mutually convenient power relations (Martin, 1971: 243)

In contrast, Talcott Parsons (1967) offered a conceptualization of power, which did not define it in terms of conflict, but rather views it as a system resource. Parsons (1967: 208) argued that power is a capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization, when obligations are legitimized with reference to the collective goals, and where in case of recalcitrance, there is a presumption of negative sanctions. In this regard, Anthony Giddens (1968: 264) stated that, among other things, the Parsonian definition does not take into account that power is exercised over someone and by treating power as necessarily legitimate and assuming a consensus between power holders. Parsons ignores the hierarchical character of power. The above two schools have demonstrated the conflict in conceptualization of the subject matter of power.

In recognition of the above conflict, Nye holds that “Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure” (Nye 1990, p.25). As the discipline of international relations was evolving, the rigid interpretation of power slowly started to change. In particular, Joseph Nye (1990: 167) argued that the changing nature of international framework has re-emphasized the use of intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions. The growing social mobilization makes the factors of technology, education, and economic growth as, if not more, significant as geography, population, and resources. Conversely, Baldwin (2012: 15) argued that the importance of military force has been previously exaggerated, while the role of nonmilitary forms of power has been underestimated.

Nye introduces two definitions of power, that is to say, the behavioural definition and the definition based on the possession of power resources. The first concept of power is associated with the behavioural definition, which is based on the observation of human behaviour. Power, in this sense, is the ability to affect the outcomes one wants, and if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen (Nye, 2002). Power is, thus, the ability to control others and make them behave in a particular way. This behavioural perception of power is derived from Robert Dahl, who emphasised that power is a relationship between two actors (Dahl, 1961). In this sense, Dahl perceived power like a matter of actor A getting actor B to do what actor A wants, or even of actor A forcing actor B not to do what actor B wants to do. As Dahl noted “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, p. 201). To predict how one will act is very difficult because “when we measure power in terms of the changed behaviour of others, we have to know their preferences” (Nye 1990, p. 26). Furthermore, “knowing in advance how other people or nations would behave in the absence of our efforts is often difficult.” However, sometimes a country can get the outcomes it wants by affecting behaviour without commanding it (Nye, 2004).

The second definition of power is based on the possession of certain power resources that can influence outcomes. Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcome one wants (Nye, 2004). In this perception, power is defined as the possession of relatively large amount of power resources which “include population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability among others” (Nye 1990, p. 26). When we look on power historically, it could be argued that the nature of power is ever changing and the resources of power are never static. This explains why, for example, oil was not such impressive power resource before the industrial age and why uranium was not very significant before the nuclear age, or why, power resources, such as advanced science, technology and nuclear weapons had a powerful impact in the twentieth century. To succeed in the international political scene, political leaders must have an excellent understanding of both definitions and the ability to apply this understanding, because proof of power lies not only in resources but also in the changed behaviour of nations (Nye 1990, p. 26). However, policy-makers and diplomats often tend to turn only to the definition based on power resources because “it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, predictable than does the behavioural definition” (Nye 1990, p. 27).

NYE’S THREE TYPES OF POWER

Nye first of all splits power into two forms: **hard and soft**. Hard and soft power can be considered two pure forms of power.

Hard or Command power

This is the oldest form of power; it is connected to the idea of an anarchic international system, where countries do not recognize any superior authority and thus

have to focus on power politics. Hard power is defined as an ability to reach one's goals through coercive actions or threats, the so-called 'carrots' and 'sticks' of international politics. Historically, hard power has been measured by such criteria as population size, territory, geography, natural resources, military force, and economic strength.

Soft power

This rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others, without the use of force, coercion or violence, but through intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority (Nye, 2008: 95). Legitimacy is central for soft power. Nye argues that soft power is as important as hard power, and even more so in international politics. Indeed, soft power enables a change of behaviour in others, without competition or conflict, by using persuasion and attraction. Furthermore, the use of hard power in the modern day would be more costly (both financially and politically), whereas it is possible to say that soft power is "free", in the sense that it does not require substantial resources and has limited consequences in case of failure. He also points out the importance of style: as soft power is a matter of seduction, behaviours such as arrogance might be counterproductive and entail repulsion rather than attraction. Nye finally acknowledges that soft power does not always have good purposes, as for example propaganda is a form of soft power: 'It is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms' (Nye, 2011, p.81). According to Maxime Gomichon (2013 p.2), In opposing hard power, soft power emphasizes not the ever-possibility of war, but the possibility of cooperation; not military power, but the power of ideas.

One of the roots of soft power could be traced to Steven Lukes' argument on the third face of power (Lukes, 1974). The first face of power was associated with Dahl (1961), who stated that an actor who wins the argument or an issue has the power. Alternatively, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argued that Dahl's approach neglected a second 'face' of power represented by the suppression of some issues, thus, in effect, keeping them from being considered. In other words, the second face refers to the ability to set the agenda (Baldwin, 2012: 5). Lukes (1974) introduced the third face of power; illustrating the ability of an actor A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do is to affect B's preferences, desires or thoughts. The first two faces of power describe how power can be used to get someone to do what you want them to, even if it against their own will. Conversely, the third face of power described how power could manipulate by changing what they want. In another example, one could trace the roots soft power in Carr's (1946: 108) writings when he equated divided power into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.

Military and economic powers are obviously the attributes of hard power, while the power over opinion could be viewed as the variant of Nye's soft power. To reiterate, legitimacy is central to soft power. When a state is able to sincerely attract and convince others with use of its values and set of practices, the country is considered to have an effective soft power. For instance, the Fulbright program is an influential aspect of

American educational soft power. In another example, Hollywood and Broadway are significant aspects of American cultural soft power. Although the co-optive power and soft power resources – cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions – are not new (Nye, 1990a: 167).

RELEVANCE OF SOFT POWER IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF WAR

Soft power is relevant to the three solutions that Liberals propose to solve the problem of war. The first is that democracies will not go to war against other democracies. In a democracy, the people have a say in the country and can impose peaceful goals. Democracies are therefore more inclined to use soft power rather than hard power. Furthermore, Nye asserts that even in case of difficulties, a democratic state will not lose its soft power. For instance, ‘in democracy, the presence of dissent and self-criticism can be beneficial: it enhances the credibility of messages’ (Nye, 2011, p.109). Thus, when a policy is criticized, it may produce some soft power as the people from other countries may see that as a proof of authenticity and as a sign of freedom of speech. The second solution to the problem of war for believers of Liberalism is economic interdependence. The fact that it constrains states to cooperate with others appears more to be coercion rather than attraction, and this solution would be therefore closer to hard power than soft power. Nye’s writings agree with that in the sense that a state with significant economic resources is likely to exert pressure on, and change the behaviour of, other states that are economically weaker. However, ‘economic resources can also produce soft as well as hard power. They can be used to attract as well as coerce’ (Nye, 2011, p.85). Thus, a free trade economy will produce soft power, as it will attract others to its model. A successful Liberal economy may create a desire in other countries to adopt this model.

International institutions are the third solution posed by Liberals to the problem of war. In promoting cooperation through common rules and norms, they foster peaceful relations. This is a core assumption of Neoliberalism, which sees institutions as a means to tone down the effects of anarchy. Nye agrees with this argument and without forgetting that cooperation is difficult to achieve; he asserts, with Robert Keohane, that the simple establishment of institutions enables them to last: ‘a set of networks, norms and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange’ (Keohane and Nye, 1998). Furthermore, Nye (2005, p.10) affirms that ‘institutions can enhance a country’s soft power’. Indeed, they are likely to promote a country’s values, ideas, policies, both with other members and countries outside the institution. Therefore, ‘if a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others’ (ibid). For instance, the United States uses institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization to promote its values of liberalism and democracy. Thus, soft power, as presented by Joseph Nye, adopts a lot of Liberal theory, and particularly of Neoliberal Institutionalism.

LIMITATIONS OF SOFT POWER

Even Nye (2015:7) admits that soft power has its limitations. In a forwarding note to **The Soft Power 30: Global Ranking of Soft Power** by Jonathan McClorys, he says “We must also be careful to recognise the limits of soft power. It is hard to see how it can be deployed, for example, to solve the ongoing Syrian crisis. But this does not mean, as some critics suggest, that soft power really is not power at all. All forms of power have limitations. When foreign policy goals include the promotion of democracy, human rights, and freedom, soft power turns out to be superior to hard power. In an era marked by increased information and a diffusion of power, it will become an increasingly important part of effective foreign policy strategies.”

A. Lack of Cooperation among soft power actors

The agents of soft power includes: States, NGOs, Civil society, Multinationals and network of actors. These bodies mostly act differently to attain their set goals since their goals are not unitary. Working independently of each other limits the possible successes derivable from soft power. Each of these bodies have their burdens and shortcomings which do not readily permit constructive cooperation among the global actors. Although the triple alliance between the state, market, and civil society are rare (Sanyal, 1998), the collective action problem makes it more likely to occur. In fact, there is evidence that in the current global framework, the establishment of networks is a key point in establishing or sustaining power and influence. The networks are becoming important and the positioning in current international network is an important power resource (Nye, 2011b: 17). So the power will likely to shift towards multifaceted networks and coalitions in a multipolar world (Nat’l Intelligence Council, 2012). In sum, the ambiguity of the actors of soft power is one of the concept’s complex areas.

B. Inadequate institutional support

Another issue that complicates the promotion of soft power is the inadequate institutional support for its research and activities. Bureaucratic structures are often a barrier towards an efficient and effective production of soft power. A significant challenge of soft power programs is that they lack integration and coordination. In the U.S., for instance, the programs that promote American soft power are fractured and spread across many agencies and departments (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 7).

C. Sustainability issues

Inadequate institutional framework for soft power ultimately leads to the sustainability issues. Long-term and substantive change in public diplomacy outcomes is also one of the most difficult to achieve (Banks, 2001: 31). The problem with public or cultural diplomacy initiatives is that they end up becoming one-time events. For example, instead of sending local artists for one concert in another country, it is more effective to set-up an exchange program for few artists to allow the continuous transfer of skills and experience.

D. Estimation difficulties

Due to the fact that hard power manifests in a very practical and concrete way, its effects are easier to see and measure (Pallaver, 2011: 81). On the contrary, the results of soft power initiatives are often intangible, with benefits not being visible until many years after the implementation of the programs. This, however, does not mean that it is not worth the investments. Soft power looks at the long-term goals and vision. Building soft power often requires a sustained effort spanning years, if not decades (McClory, 2011: 23).

Given the identified weaknesses of soft power, finally, Nye introduces smart power as the 'balance of hard and soft power'.

SMART POWER

Hard and soft powers are interrelated. They can reinforce each other, but sometimes they can interfere with and undercut each other. Thus, it is very important to have very good "contextual intelligence" which is needed to distinguish how these two types of power can interact in different situations. It is clear that, for example, intangible resources like patriotism, morale, and legitimacy can strongly affect the capacity to fight and win a war. Similarly, threats to use force are intangible however they are a dimension of hard power. It is perhaps surprising, but many of the terms that are used daily such as military power and economic power are hybrids that combine both resources and behaviours.

In political practice, it is thus important to possess the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies, which is called **smart power**. Nye introduced the term smart power in 2003 "to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy" (Nye 2012, p. 1). The first step towards smart power and effective power conversion strategies is an understanding of the full range of power resources and the problem of combining them effectively in various contexts. Smart power strategies could be compared to the proclamation of US President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901: "Speak softly and carry a big stick." (Nye 2013, p.58). Simply put, smart power addresses multilateralism and enhances foreign policy. To take an example, the end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which fell as a result of a combination of hard and soft power. Throughout the Cold War, hard power was used to deter Soviet aggression and soft power was used to erode faith in Communism. As Nye said: "When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism." (Nye 2013, p. 59). The former American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the diplomacy of the twenty-first century and importance of smart power in the following words: "America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal." (Nye 2013, p. 60).

In practice, smart power strategies can be used not only by large states such as the United States, but also by small states. Some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states (Nye, 2004) have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. To take an example, Norway, a small state with five million people, has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimizing policies in peacemaking and development assistance that enhance its soft power (Nye, 2013). Norway has taken a hand in peace talks in the Philippines, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Guatemala and the Balkans (Nye, 2004).

Similarly, but other end of the spectrum in terms of population size, China, a rising power in hard economic and military resources, has deliberately decided to invest massively in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbours (Nye, 2013). When we look at Nye's view on power from historical perspective, it could be argued the nature of power is ever changing. When we survey the distribution of power throughout history, it is clear that the five-century old modern state system shows that the sources of power are never static and different power resources played critical role in different periods. Nye explains this change gradually from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first century. It is not surprising that in earlier periods, power resources were easier to judge.

CRITICISM OF NYE'S POWER TYPES

Joseph Nye's power postulations have generated commentaries and arguments. While some praise the effort others have criticized it for different reasons. Maxime Gomichon, thinks Nye set out to ensure that the United States maintains its stranglehold on international power. He argues (Maxime Gomichon 2013) "Further evidence that Nye is defending the U.S., and trying to find the best solution for it, is that he sometimes steps away from Neoliberal assumptions themselves". He acknowledges that military force is sometimes useful when the security of the state is threatened. That may challenge his theory of complex interdependence, of which the main condition is abandonment of military force. Thus, he sometimes takes off the clothes of the theorist to put on those of the politician, noting: 'As a former assistant secretary of defense, I would be the last to deny the continuing importance of military power. Our military role is essential to global stability. And the military is part of our response to terrorism' (Nye, 2002, XV).

The same conclusion - that Nye set out to make the United States not just the superpower but the only superpower is reached by Paul Cammack. Cammack holds that by projecting smart power which is a combination of soft and hard powers, Nye has by himself vitiated the force of soft power and this was because he cherishes the U.S military might and won't want to place anything above it. According to him "Insistence on America's status as the 'only superpower', obsessive concern with potential rivals, and jealous defence of the coveted position of 'Number One' has become counter-productive. Far from it being the case that hard power plus soft power equals smart

power, America's reluctance to compromise its preponderance in terms of hard power acts as an impediment to rational action in the international arena. Hard power can detract from soft power, and the smart thing would be to recognise it". (Paul Cammack 2008, p .8).

On my part, I am persuaded to think that the return to hard power disguised as smart power was not made in good faith. Nations with stronger military-might will lord it over weaker ones under the pretense of smart power. Nye's advice that smart power needs to be deployed under contextual intelligence makes no difference as actors are at liberty to interpret the appellation – contextual intelligence to suit their whims.

CONCLUSION

Joseph Nye leveraged on his huge experience in public service especially within the security circle and his long standing academic service to articulate a road map for engagement in international power politics. Following the liberal tradition, he and Keohane advanced neoliberal ideas aimed at curtailing wars and aggression in the international arena. Convinced that hard power can win victories but cannot win hearts and minds, Nye introduced soft power as alternative and better engagement option than hard power. He thinks nations can leverage on their power resources like culture, attractive personality, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority to persuade others to do their bidding. But for soft power deployment to be effective, the agent of the power has to enjoy legitimacy. Legitimacy is thus central for soft power and democratic states alone can make claim to legitimacy. Given the weaknesses and shortcomings of soft power as persuasions may not always deliver the needed results, Nye in his later writings makes a case for a combination of soft power and hard power to arrive at smart power. According to him smart power addresses multilateralism and enhances foreign policy.

REFERENCES

- Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S., 1962. Two Faces of Power. *American Political Science Review*, 56: 947-52
- Baldwin, D. A. 2012. Power and International Relations, in *Handbook of International Relations*. [online] Available at [http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20\(2012\)%20Power%20and%20International%20Relations.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(2012)%20Power%20and%20International%20Relations.pdf) [accessed on 25 January 2016]
- Doyle, M., 1986. 'Liberalism and World Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, 80(4), pp.1151-1169
- Cammack, P., (2008), "Smart Power and US Leadership: A Critique of Joseph Nye", 49th Parallel, Vol. 22 (Autumn), pp.4-20 Available at : www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk
- Dahl, R. (1957): The Concept of Power. [Online.] In: *Behavioural Science*, 1957, 2, pp. 201-215. [Cited 5.2.2021.] Available online:
- Dahl, R. (1961): *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. 55 p. ISBN 978-0300103922.

- Giddens, A., 1968. Power in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons, *Sociology*, 2.
- Gomichon, M.,(2013) Joseph Nye on Soft Power <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>, MAR 8 201
- Keohane, R., 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Chichester: Princeton University Press
- Keohane, R., and Nye, J., 1977. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Keohane, R., and Nye, J., 1998. 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', *Foreign Affairs*, 77(5), pp.81-94
- Krištofová , B.,(2022) Joseph Samuel Nye and the Concept of Power in International Relations: theoretical framework and practical examples.K *Slovak Journal of International Relations*,, no. 1
- Lukes, S. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*, second ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Martin, R., 1971, *The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence*. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 22(3)
- McClory, J., (2015), *The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power*.www.softpower30.com
- Nye, J. (1990): *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 370 p. ISBN 978-0465007448.
- Nye, J., 2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J., 2005. 'On the Rise and Fall of American Soft Power', *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 22(3), pp.75-77
- Nye, J.S. Jr. and Armitage, R.L., 2007. *CSIS Commission on Smart Power. A smarter, more secure America* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington (pdf)
- Parsons, T., 1967. *On the Concept of Political Power*, in T. Parsons (ed.), *Sociological Theory and Modern Society*. New York: The Free Press.
- Raimzhanova, A. (2015). *Power in IR: Hard, soft, and smart*. *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest*, 20, 1-20.
- Weber, M., 1947, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. By A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. Glencoe: The Free Press.